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Abstract
Theories of economic globalization suggest that public opinion-public policy congruence
should be affected by states’ degree of integration with international markets. With as much
attention researchers have given to the opinion-policy linkage in the American states, it is
surprising that this literature has neglected these well-known globalization frameworks. We take
advantage of the wide variation in US states’ integration in global markets, public policies, and
political orientations of citizens, to assess whether global market integration depresses the
association between citizen opinion and public policies. Using three decades of state-level data,
our results suggest that high global market integration does not attenuate the relationship
between state opinion and state public spending. Not only does this finding run counter to the
well-known policy convergence thesis, but our results also suggest that the association between
opinion and policy in the American states may be strongest under conditions of high global
market integration.
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Because many theories assert that the quality of government, especially democracies, can
in part be assessed by whether public policies mirror the public preferences, political scientists
have long sought to assess the relationship between public opinion and public policy (Erikson, et
al. 1993.; Dahl 1989). A positive link between opinion and policy has been demonstrated across
enough diverse domains that it is even referred to as ‘conventional wisdom’ within parts of the
discipline (see Burstein 2003, 29). 2 Although the dominant view suggests a substantial opinionpolicy linkage, a group of mostly recent studies offer important critical or qualifying arguments.
Jacobs and Shapiro (2000) note that elite manipulation of public opinion, rather than
responsiveness, may help explain much of the opinion-policy linkage. Others argue that many of
the traditional approaches to assess opinion-policy congruence may mask the true relationship
between public opinion and policy (Bartels 2008; Gilens and Page 2014). A growing number of
scholars largely accept that a connection exists, but seek to identify factors that enhance or
attenuate the strength of the opinion-policy linkage (Monroe 1998; Monogan 2013; Lax and
Phillips 2012; Radcliff and Saiz 1995; Krueger and Mueller 2001; Jacobs and Page 2005; Gilens
2005; Flavin 2012). Overall this literature points to the need for further consideration of when
and how opinion and policy are connected.
With as much attention the U.S. opinion-policy linkage has received in general over the
past few decades and with the search for qualifiers enriching this debate recently, it is surprising
that the literature has neglected to consider theories of economic globalization. Two of the most
prominent theoretical frameworks for understanding economic globalization provide a central
position for democratic responsiveness, and hence the opinion-policy connection. Additionally,
much of the framing of economic globalization in the news media centers on governments
disregarding their citizen’s wishes in favor of global bond markets and international corporations.
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Just recently, the Greek government ignored a one-week-old citizen referendum and accepted the
European Union’s austerity demands and the U.S. negotiated the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade
agreement in secret --without any citizen input to reject. The New York Times chronicled
widespread cutting of “public services” across the American states due to revenue shortfalls
caused in part by concessions made to global corporations; many U.S. state “officials said they
feared that companies would move jobs overseas” if billions of dollars in special tax treatment
ended (Story 2012).
The opinion-policy literature’s past inattention to economic globalization is somewhat
understandable. Decades ago, when the iconic studies that built the foundation of the opinionpolicy congruence literature emerged, the U.S. had among the lowest exposure to global trade as
percentage of GDP compared to other OECD countries.

But understanding the U.S. as a

globalization outlier no longer applies, as the United States has tripled its reliance on
international trade as a percentage of GDP from 1977 to 2010 (see Owen and Quinn 2014).
Additionally, the diversity at the U.S. state level has long been used to examine the opinionpolicy congruence and offers a fruitful place to examine the implications of economic
globalization on the opinion-policy connection because state economies have varying degrees of
integration with the global marketplace. 3
In this paper, we offer an initial test of whether the degree of American states' global
market integration moderates the relationship between citizen opinion and government spending
from 1987 to 2006. A study incorporating globalization theories not only enhances our
understanding of the potential moderators of the opinion-policy linkage, but also provides a new
domain to test competing views of economic globalization. The structure of the paper is as
follows. In the next section, we discuss the policy convergence and room to maneuver theoretical
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frameworks and connect these competing theories to expectations about the opinion-policy linkage
in the American states. Then we introduce our data and methods and present the major findings.
Using three decades of state-level data, our results suggest that high global market integration does
not attenuate the relationship between state opinion and state public spending, which runs counter
to the well-known policy convergence thesis. Finally we offer a discussion of the implications of
our results and suggest some limitations of these initial findings.
Policy Convergence Theory
Policy convergence theory ranks as the most widely recognized theory regarding the
relationship between economic globalization and public policy (Mosley 2005). Convergence
theory argues that high levels of integration with global markets encourage public policies that
conform to corporate preferences and eventually converge. Capital mobility and competition
between states to attract and retain this capital underpin the convergence logic. Mobile firms in
the global market become increasingly averse to residing in regions that sustain large public
sectors, which are seen to decrease work incentives, increase the costs of business operations,
and ultimately reduce profit (Garrett 1998). In a highly globalized environment where capital
and firms can relocate their business to the most favorable locale relatively easily, states are
pressured to structure state spending in order to provide a low cost environment for
corporations. 4 As a result, under the pressure of “capital flight” with globalization, state policy
will converge, as states race-to-the-bottom in public spending.
From this perspective, the needs of corporations in the global market dominate state
spending policies. States that are highly integrated with the global market and wish to take an
alternative policy track cannot do so without suffering negative economic consequences. As
Waltz reminds us, “states can defy the ‘herd,’ but they will pay a price, usually a steep one,” as
5

high spending states will encourage capital flight (Waltz 1999, 694). Because elected officials
have difficulty remaining in power with economic downturns such as job losses or wage declines,
states, regardless of their ideological proclivities, are predicted to converge at a low public
spending bottom under pressures of economic globalization.
Garrett suggests that for convergence theory, “political autonomy, if not de jure
sovereignty, is considered the primary ‘casualty’ of globalization” (Garrett 1998, 788, see also
Agné 2011; Habermas 1999; Dahl 1989; Held 1995). And although state political autonomy
alone may not be sufficient for a strong connection between citizens’ opinions and public policy,
it is a necessary condition (Agné 2011). Because the needs of the global market dominate
policymaking, and citizens’ views become relatively less important, the citizen opinion-public
policy connection should be attenuated.5 As Piven notes about globalization in the American
states, “[c]itizenship loses much of its meaning if governments cannot act on matters crucial to
the economic well-being of ordinary people. In this sense, democratic rights are rolled back”
(Piven 2001, 28).
Room to Maneuver
Policy convergence theory ranks as the best known framework for understanding how
capital mobility affects states’ ability to make policy choices reflecting public opinion.

The

room to maneuver approach is often seen as its chief theoretical rival. In short, the room to
maneuver hypothesis suggests that, “political reactions to globalization are not entirely
preprogrammed by globalization itself but also depend on domestic structures” (Genschel 2004,
632; see also Mosley 2005, 355). Indeed, the earliest work in this area by Cameron (1978) and
Katzenstein (1985) shows that instead of globalization leading to a race to the bottom, it instead
often triggers greater public spending because citizens increase their demands for governmental
6

compensation and protections against the risks and anxieties associated with increased global
market integration (Agné 2011).
Geoffrey Garrett, one of the best known empirical researchers in this area, shows through
his analysis of advanced democracies that the “benefits of globalization can be reaped without
undermining the economic sovereignty of nations, and without reducing the ability of citizens to
choose how to distribute benefits – and the costs – of the market” (Garrett 1998, 6). Importantly,
in the mostly European nations that are analyzed by Garrett, increased economic globalization
typically amplifies the demands of citizens that want increased public social services and
protections. For Garrett, economic globalization enhances the “political logic of voice,” from the
people in the area of social protections by “strengthened political incentives for governments to
use the policy instruments of the state to mitigate dislocations by redistributing wealth and risk”
(Garrett 1998, 789-791).
In part because the room to maneuver hypothesis is known to diverge sharply with
convergence theory, and because social democratic parties in Europe have been a core focus of
empirical research, room to maneuver is often associated with increases in social spending. But
a close reading of the theory suggests that room to maneuver is more accurately described as
states having the ability to use a variety of tools and policies to respond to the challenges
associated with economic globalization. Policy option is key. Garrett is certainly aware that
states can maneuver in various ways, “social democratic/left parties respond to globalization
differently than center right and right parties” (Garrett 1995, 658; see also Burgoon 2001; Agné
2011). Conservatives often argue that in the face of increased economic global competition,
making the state environment the most attractive to capital by cutting public spending offers the
best chance for corporations and citizens alike to prosper. In other words, rather than growing
7

the public sector to provide more social welfare benefits and other government services,
conservatives want “supply side oriented economic policies that emphasize growth and
employment” that will retain globally mobile capital in the state and by extension keep the
unemployment rate low, obviating much of the need for public services (Swank 2005, 188).
This logic may be particularly efficacious in the U.S. context because welfare state
legitimacy is lowest in Anglo-Liberal democracies and the U.S. in particular (Brooks and Manza
2006b; Brooks and Manza 2006a). In the U.S. small government arguments are more accepted
generally, and economic globalization, with its threat of capital exit, provides a structural context
that may strengthen the logic of existing conservative desires for the nature of public spending
(Piven 2001). In other words, when exposed to global market competition, conservative
citizenries will use the global market logic to push for reductions in public expenditures to attract
and retain capital, with the hopes that this will bring a robust economy and high wage jobs.
Altogether, the room to maneuver hypothesis suggest that economic globalization should
not sever the link between citizen opinion and policy. Although liberals and conservatives will
approach solving the challenges associated with economic globalization differently, citizens in
states that have globally integrated economies will demand that states conform to their view of
how public policies should deal with the global marketplace. When highly exposed to global
market pressures, states with liberal populations will demand a robust public sector to
compensate for the vagaries and anxiety associated with economic globalization. Conservative
citizens in highly globalized states will use the threat of capital flight and global competition to
press for efficiency in the form of low public spending. Critically, room to maneuver not only
suggests that liberal and conservative citizens will demand different policy outcomes, but that
states will have the ability to match their public policies to various citizen preferences.
8

Hypotheses
The two theoretical frameworks suggest different implications for the citizen opinionpublic policy connection in the U.S. states.

In situations where public opinion generally

influences public policy, we would expect the following empirical implications of the theories
presented above:
Convergence Hypothesis
The relationship between state citizen ideology and state public policies should be weaker
in states with high global trade compared to states with low global trade.
Room to Maneuver Hypothesis
The relationship between state citizen ideology and state public policies should not be
weaker in states with high global trade compared to states with low global trade.
If the marginal effect of state citizen ideology on public policy is weaker in highly
globalized states compared to lowly globalized states, then the evidence would support the
convergence hypothesis. If the marginal effect of state citizen ideology on public policy is not
statistically different (null) or stronger in highly globalized states compared to low globalized
states, then the evidence would support the room to maneuver hypothesis. 6 Although crossnational empirical studies of globalization and public policy often evaluate the independent
connection between global trade and public policy, the global trade public policy linkage is not
key to evaluating our hypotheses; we are focused instead on whether high levels of global trade
attenuates the citizen opinion-policy connection. Throughout the manuscript, when considering
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the hypotheses, we will compare the independent relationship between citizen opinion and public
policy when states have low versus high levels of global trade.

Data and Methods
We utilize pooled cross-sectional time-series (CSTS) data from 1987 to 2006 to assess
the applicability of these competing frameworks for understanding how the degree of global
market integration influences the linkage between public opinion and public spending in the
American states. Broadly considered, we estimate overall state government spending and state
government spending on welfare as a function of state citizen opinion liberalism and its
interaction with two distinct, but overlapping, measures of economic globalization at the state
level: trade dependence and trade exposure (detailed below). These interactions test for any
conditional effect that economic globalization may have on the public opinion-public spending
linkage. This approach follows Monogan, Gray, and Lowery’s (2009, 306) technique for
assessing whether the “effect of opinion liberalism on policy liberalism differs between initiative
and noninitiative states,” except that we consider how state level global market integration
conditions the association between opinion and policy. We use a fixed effects estimator with
robust standard errors that includes both state and year fixed effects. We estimate the following
equation of per capita state expenditures,

𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒.𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽3 (𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 × 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜)𝑖𝑖 + 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑖
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(1)

where opinion is a state i’s citizen opinion liberalism in year t. Globe is a state’s degree of global
market integration, and globe x opinion is their interaction. Control is a vector of relevant control
variables, α is the state fixed effects, δ is the year fixed effects, and μ is the error term. The
control variables are included to account for macro conditions that influence a state’s 1) ability to
spend money (i.e. per capita income) and 2) the demand for public spending (i.e. unemployment
rate). After we control for states’ ability to spend on programs as well as the states’ demand for
program spending, we expect that citizens’ political opinion should help predict the remaining
variance in the amount of state spending, with liberal states spending more and conservative
states spending less. In other words, assessing the public opinion - state spending connection
only serves as a measure of congruence when the key macro level factors have been held
constant. Below we detail the two expenditure measures used as dependent variables, as well as
the relevant independent variables.
Considering that little consensus exists about the best way to handle cross-sectional timeseries data (Greene 2011; Baltagi, et al. 2003), we also ran a set of dynamic error correction
models (ECMs) as an alternative to our fixed effect models following Banerjee, et al. (1993), De
Boef (2001) and De Boef and Keele’s (2008). Details of the ECM modeling strategy, as well as
the results are presented in Appendix 2. The results from the two modeling approaches are
broadly consistent and suggest that while facing higher levels of globalization, the independent
relationship between mass liberalism and public spending in the American states is not
attenuated. Table 1 and the discussion that follows present the measurements and data sources of
the variables in detail.
Dependent Variables
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We use as our dependent variables two different categories of per capita government
spending – overall state public expenditure and expenditures on welfare. Data on these measures
are collected from State and Local Government Finance of the Census Bureau. The typical state
averages approximately $3,500 in total expenditures per person in the population and just over
$700 in per capita welfare expenditures, with each of these distributions approaching normal. We
use per capita spending to distinguish between states of varying populations and to facilitate
interpretation of the results. 7

Core Independent Variables
State Citizen Opinion Liberalism
Because it offers a long time series and relies on citizens, rather than elite proxies, we use
a voter liberalism score created by Pacheco (2011) as the measure of state voter ideology. This
measure is derived from state exit polls using Multilevel Regression with Post-stratification
(MRP) and represents the collective general ideological orientation of state voters. The score
ranges from 0 to 100, with higher values indicating a more liberal electorate. Overtime measures
of specific policy opinion are not available; fortunately, general political ideology by far best
predicts state level social spending, compared to all other policy outputs (Brace, et al. 2002,
183). 8

Global Market Integration: Trade Dependence and Exposure
Because “increasing trade competition is the first component of the conventional
globalization thesis” we use two distinct, but overlapping, measures to capture different aspects
of global market integration (Garrett 1998, 792). The first measure is state exports as a
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percentage of Gross State Product (GSP). We refer to this measure as trade dependence and
believe it to best capture the relative size of a state’s exporting economy. This variable mirrors
trade measures that are commonly used in cross-national studies. Krugman (2008) refers to it as
a measure of how crucial trade is to an economy and also as a measure of trade importance or
trade reliance. Economies with larger shares of state incomes derived from international exports
are more trade dependent. Data on state-level exportation data are collected from the Foreign
Trade Division of the Department of Commerce in the Census. We would have preferred using
total trade (imports plus exports as a percentage of GSP) as our measure, to be consistent with
the cross-national studies, but state level importation data are not available for the time series.
Even so, the correlations between U.S. national-level export and total trade from 1960-2012 are
over 0.9, which suggests that our state-level export measure is highly correlated with the statelevel total trade measure.
Economic globalization is a complex process, and what a state exports matters for
economic performance and how individuals experience international trade (Hausmann, et al.
2007). We therefore construct a second measure of global market integration, trade exposure, to
better capture the positioning of a state’s exporting economy. Trade exposure is an index of
states’ comparative advantage/disadvantage in particular industries weighted by an industry’s
position on the U.S. net exports – net import spectrum. Appendix 1 describes the construction of
the trade exposure index.
The trade exposure index has several favorable qualities. First, it exploits industry-level
data in order to identify a state’s comparative advantage in a particular industry. In this analysis
we use state data on the relative sizes of three industries: services, agriculture, and manufacturing.
Second, it also uses U.S. export and import data, which easily go back to the 1980s and are much
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more available than state-level data. This feature allows us to exploit state variation in alignment
with U.S. strengths. Lastly, the combination of a state-level comparative advantage index with
U.S.-level export and import data make the trade exposure measure comparable across states and
years.
Higher levels of trade exposure imply that a state has an economy built around goods or
services for which the U.S. does not have a comparative advantage. This implies that a state’s
production takes place in competition with net imports of similar goods or services. On the other
hand, lower levels of trade exposure suggest a state has an economy built around an industry in
which the U.S. also has a comparative advantage, as suggested by the U.S. being a net exporter
of that industry’s goods or services.
Since we are primarily interested in assessing whether states’ global market integration
attenuates the relationship between state voter ideology and state spending, we also include the
multiplicative term of the core independent variables to test for any conditional effect.
[INSERT TABLE 1 NEAR HERE]
Control Variables
Because the degree of female participation in the work force has been shown to be an
important predictor of public spending (Huber and Stephens 2001) we include the percentage of
female adults in the labor force. We include a measure of the age of the state population because
public spending in the United States is particularly geared towards older adults and children
(Busemeyer 2007; Lynch 2006). Using data from the US Census we include the percentage of
the state population that is over 65 and under 18 years old. 9
Gilens (1996) argues that white Americans perceive that African Americans
disproportionately benefit from social programs, which depresses support for activist
14

government. State-level studies have demonstrated a similar effect, such that states with large
black minority populations have lower levels of welfare spending or less generous welfare
policies (Brown 1995; Fellowes and Rowe 2004; Soss, et al. 2001; Hero and Preuhs 2007).
Accordingly, we include a control for the percentage of the state population that is African
American.
Vulnerable groups such as the unemployed have been shown to be supporters of
government spending as well as directly increase the costs of social programs (Lowery and Berry
1983; Lewis-Beck and Rice 1985). Therefore, we include the percentage of the unemployed as a
control variable.
Following classic accounts such as Wagner (1877; see also Lowery and Berry,
1983), state economic affluence explains government spending, in that high income states have
the capacity to spend more. We include state-level real per capita income as well as the growth
rate of state-level real per capita income as controls, following earlier work by Burgoon (2001)
and Rudra and Haggard (2005). Data on state-level real per capita income and real per capita
income growth are collected from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
The power resources theory suggests that governments controlled by left parties
will spend more on state programs (Huber and Stephens 2001; Moller, et al. 2003; Huber, et al.
2006; Kelly and Witko 2012). Party competition encourages political parties to compete with one
another for the broadest range of the electorate, motivating them to spend more on social
programs (Dawson and Robinson 1963).Therefore, we include state government partisan control
and party competition in our model. Partisan control is an index of the party that controls the
state senate, house and governorship. It ranges from 0 to 3, with 0 indicating all three branches
controlled by the Democratic Party and 3 indicating all three branches controlled by the
15

Republican Party. Party competition is a folded Ranney index measuring state-level competition
between the two parties (Ranney 1976).
Lastly, considering that the manufacturing industry is the most vulnerable to
globalization and that it comprises the largest trade sector, we include % of manufacturing
industry as the total size of the economy as a control (Bernard and Jensen 1995). Since the trade
exposure measure has already taken into consideration the size of manufacturing, we exclude this
control variable from the trade exposure models. Data on state-level manufacturing are collected
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Findings
Tables 2 and 3 present the results for the pooled cross sectional and time series (CSTS)
models for per capita government spending. The overall state public expenditure models are
presented in Table 2 and expenditures on welfare are presented in Table 3. We use the two
approaches detailed above to consider a state's degree of global market integration. The first
approach focuses on the size of the state's exporting economy (trade dependence) whereas the
second considers the positioning or comparative global advantage or disadvantage of that state's
economy (trade exposure). Due to their empirical and theoretical overlap we test the moderating
effects of trade exposure and trade dependence on the opinion-policy connection separately to
avoid the inflation of standard errors.
[INSERT TABLE 2 NEAR HERE]
Total Expenditures
We begin in Models (1) and (2) by excluding any interaction term from the model to
demonstrate that we are working with data that replicate the standard finding in the literature;
16

these results show that after controlling for a variety of other structural factors, states with more
liberal state populations tend to have higher levels of total public expenditures. This independent
connection between state liberalism and state public expenditures is displayed graphically in
Figure 1 and is conventionally seen as evidence of opinion-policy congruence. 10 We repeat this
same replication approach in models (1) and (2) of Table 2; in each case, opinion liberalism has
an independent effect on state spending, demonstrating that this connection is robust even with
alternative dependent variables and changes to the model specification.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 NEAR HERE]
Next, we turn to Table 2, Model (3), which builds upon the baseline model by adding the
interaction term between the trade exposure measure and the opinion liberalism measure. The
interaction term reaches conventional thresholds for statistical significance suggesting that trade
exposure indeed moderates the relationship between opinion liberalism and the relative degree of
overall public expenditures in the American states. The interaction term makes straightforward
interpretation of the coefficients challenging from the tables alone. Therefore, we use the Clarify
program to graph the relationship between opinion and state spending for low and high trade
exposure states, where high and low are defined as plus or minus one standard deviation from the
mean exposure (King, et al. 2000).
[INSERT FIGURE 2 NEAR HERE]
The key hypothesis test assesses whether higher levels of trade exposure attenuates the
overall positive opinion-policy connection.

Policy convergence theory expects that the

ideological desires of citizens will be less important as states become more exposed to global
markets. In other words, citizen ideology should have lower correspondence with public
17

expenditures in highly exposed states. The room to maneuver hypothesis diverges from this
expectations, as it suggests that state governments have the ability to adopt different degrees of
state spending to confront the pressures of high global exposure; and because states have various
options, the state spending approaches will reflect the ideological orientation of the citizenry. As
can be seen from Figure 2, the association between citizen opinion and the states’ degree of
public spending is not weaker in states with high trade exposure. When states are exposed to low
levels of globalization, moving from a low degree to a high degree of liberalism does not
significantly alter the degree of overall state spending. However, when states face high trade
exposure, moving from a low degree to a high degree of liberalism increases total state per capita
spending by about 20%. The marginal effect of citizen opinion, indicated by the slope of the
predicted lines, is higher in states with high trade exposure compared to states with low trade
exposure. This finding that opinion and public spending is more congruent in highly exposed
states diverges sharply from the expectations of convergence theory and aligns well with the
room to maneuver perspective.
Next, we turn to model (4), which adds the interaction term between the trade
dependence measure and the opinion liberalism measure.

The interaction term reaches a

standard threshold (P<.05) for statistical significance indicating that we can have some
confidence that trade dependence moderates the relationship between opinion liberalism and the
relative degree of overall public expenditures in the American states.

To clarify the

understanding of the interaction term we again graph a figure that displays the relationship
between opinion and state spending; in Figure 3, we plot the predicted overall state government
spending based on citizen opinion liberalism for low and high trade dependence states by using
the Clarify program (King, et al. 2000). The pattern is familiar. The relationship between opinion
18

liberalism and overall state spending, indicated by the slope of the predicted line, is stronger in
high trade dependent states compared to low trade dependent states.

Because there is no

attenuation of opinion’s marginal effect on spending in highly dependent states relative to low
dependent states, the convergence theory is again unsupported, even when considering this
alternative measure of states’ integration to the global marketplace. Indeed, the results again
suggest that global pressures increase the correspondence between citizen opinion and policy.
This suggests that states react to global market pressures in a way consistent with the ideological
predispositions of their citizens.
[INSERT FIGURE 3 NEAR HERE]
Welfare Expenditures
Because states have great leeway to make targeted and diverse policy innovations to
address similar state challenges, it is often difficult to fully standardize states’ relative
commitment to addressing specific issues by measuring spending on a particular program. This
explains why many past studies use total expenditures (Radcliff and Saiz 1998) or a large basket
of diverse state policies (Wright, et al. 1987) to measure the degree of state policy liberalism.
However, the policy convergence literature has had a special emphasis on welfare state
convergence, as social safety net spending is seen as the most inefficient spending (Swank 2005;
Adsera and Boix 2002). It may be that when welfare spending is considered, rather than overall
state spending, the attenuation effect predicted by the policy convergence theory will emerge; we
may see the marginal effect of opinion on spending reduced in high trade environments relative
to low trade environments. To test this we run the same sequence of models but change the
dependent variable to per capita state spending on welfare. 11 These results are presented in Table
3.
19

[INSERT TABLE 3 NEAR HERE]
The first welfare spending hypothesis test is shown in Model (3) of Table 3. The
interaction term of trade exposure and state opinion liberalism reaches a standard threshold for
statistical significance, which suggests that trade exposure conditions the relationship between
opinion liberalism and welfare spending. Again, to better understand the results we graphically
display the slope of opinion liberalism for low and high level trade exposure states by using the
Clarify program (see Figure 4). Consistent with the results from the previous models, Figure 4
shows that the strength of the citizen opinion-welfare spending relationship, as indicated by the
slope, is somewhat steeper for high exposure states compared to low exposure states. This again
differs from the convergence theory expectation that citizen opinion will become disconnected
from policy in states that are highly exposed to global markets. Once more, these results support
the expectations of the room to maneuver hypothesis, which predicts no attenuation of the citizen
opinion-policy connection when states are highly exposed to global markets.
Finally, we turn to model (4) of Table 3, which again uses welfare expenditures as the
dependent variable but uses the trade dependence measure to capture states’ global market
integration. The interaction term of trade dependence and citizen liberalism is not statistically
significant. Figure 5 shows that the independent association of citizen liberalism and welfare
expenditures is comparable across states with high and low trade dependence (the association is
slightly stronger in high dependence environments). Because the link between citizen opinion
liberalism and state welfare spending is very similar at high and low levels of trade dependence,
the evidence again conforms to the room to maneuver hypothesis. This is the key finding for
testing the hypotheses -the relationship between opinion and spending is not lower in high trade
states relative to low trade states.
20

Discussion
Because of the implications for the quality of democracy, a large body of work assesses
the linkage between public opinion and public policy. Generally the correspondence between
opinion and policy has been robust, but in recent years several studies have sought to identify
factors that weaken or strengthen the opinion-policy connection. Burstein has even challenged
researchers to more deeply study how various contextual factors promote or attenuate the
opinion-policy connection (see Burstein 2010). This paper follows this conditional perspective
by connecting well-known economic globalization theories to the opinion-policy congruence
literature. Drawing upon competing theories of economic globalization, we leverage the special
characteristics of the American states, such as the availability of over-time opinion data, a wide
range of citizen ideology, the state economies’ large differences in the degree of global market
integration, and state governments’ substantial control over public spending, to explicitly assess
whether global market integration conditions the ties between citizen opinion and certain public
policies.
Our results suggest that the degree of global market integration does moderate the
relationship between public opinion and state spending.

Yet, the specific nature of this

moderation casts doubt on the well-known policy convergence thesis. Under conditions of high
economic globalization, rather than public opinion becoming less relevant as a determinant of
fundamental public spending policies, thereby flattening the opinion-policy linkage as the
convergence thesis implies, higher trade seems to often strengthen the positive association
between opinion and policy in the American states. This empirical pattern fits with the room to
maneuver perspective that suggests states have various options when selecting the suitable
solutions to the anxieties and challenges associated with economies that are highly exposed to
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international pressures. In highly globalized state economies, our results suggest that a liberal
citizenry will be especially likely to see their state increases public expenditures. But when
citizens hold conservative views their argument for a neo-liberal policy path of low public
spending is particularly likely to manifest in state policy. Because both the policy convergence
and room to maneuver perspectives argue that state spending becomes more salient in a highly
globalized context, one way to comprehend these results is to view the findings through the lens
of past studies that show that the opinion-policy linkage is strongest when policies are highly
salient (e.g. Lax and Phillips 2012).
Despite much of the theorizing about economic globalization deeply conditioning state
sovereignty and the associated implications for democratic responsiveness, the cross-national
globalization literature has paid "little attention to mass politics” (Hellwig 2007, 772). Part of
the explanation for the lack of attention to citizen opinions in this literature probably stems from
the scarcity of multi-decade, cross-nationally comparable opinion data. Fortunately, the U.S.
states have long been used to consider the opinion-policy linkage. But even with the growth of
U.S. global trade over time, and the appreciation that the fiscally decentralized American states
should be especially sensitive to global market pressures (Piven 2001; Weingast 1995), to date
no empirical studies at the U.S. sub-national level explore the potential effect of global market
integration on the connection between opinion and public policies.

As such, our paper

contributes in multiple ways. It offers one of the only tests of well-known competing views of
economic globalization as it relates to the connection between mass attitudes and public policy
and it shows that global market integration should be considered a potential (even likely)
moderator of the opinion policy linkage in the American states.
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Finally, this paper contributes to the unresolved debate about whether the public opinionpolicy linkage has increased or decreased in the United States over the past several decades (for a
review of the debate see Burstein 2003; 2010). If the public opinion-policy linkage indeed has
decreased, at first glance then it seems plausible that economic globalization has played a role.
The time period considered in this debate corresponds closely with the large relative increase in
U.S. global trade, with global trade nearly tripling over the past 30 years (Owen and Quinn 2014).
And certainly the most prominent theories of economic globalization explicitly suggest that the
power of the public over policy will be directly affected by increasing international market
involvement and competition. Our initial results suggest that across the American states, high
levels of global market integration correspond with somewhat stronger links between public
opinion and public policy. Accordingly, our results suggest that the increase in international
market exposure is not a likely culprit of a decline in the public opinion-policy linkage over time
in the U.S. Instead, it actually may be a countervailing force against the general tide of opinionpolicy attenuation.
Perhaps more than anything else, our results from a diversity of models can be seen as
consistent evidence against the opinion-policy attenuation effect predicted by the policy
convergence thesis. Still, because our work represents a preliminary exploration of economic
globalization and the opinion-policy linkage in the American states, and because some of our
results and robustness checks show no conditioning (neither strengthening nor weakening of the
opinion-policy link), our results about the link between opinion and policy in highly globalized
states should be viewed with some caution. In particular, poor measurement of the key variables,
particularly the globalization measures, could be the source of the null or significant conditional
results. Noisy measures inflate standard errors and often lead to null results; biased measures,
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and other data and modeling imperfections, could produce false positive findings. Critically then,
more work, with different modeling approaches, data, and assumptions are needed to better
understand why the connection between opinion and policy appears to be equal or somewhat
stronger in highly globalized states. Given the overall paucity of research in this specific area, we
hope our work encourages new research exploring global market exposure and the opinionpolicy linkage in the American states.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Core Variables. (U.S. States, 1987-2006)
VARIABLES

Mean

St. Dev.

Total State Expenditures (per capita)

3,558.3

1,513.8

State Welfare Expenditures (per capita)

721.4

369.5

Liberalism

20.5

3.3

Trade Exposure

7.5

2.4

Trade Dependence*

5.6

3.3

Liberalism x Trade Exposure

155.0

55.6

Liberalism x Trade Dependence*

116.8

77.7

% Unemployment

5.3

1.4

% Black

10.1

9.4

Real Per Capita Income (thousands)

32.3

4.0

% Real Per Capita Income Growth

1.4

2.0

Dependency Ratio

0.62

0.05

% Female Labor Force Partic. Rate

60.0

4.5

Partisan Control

1.4

1.0

Party Competition

.63

.1

% Manufacturing Output

15.0

6.3

Observations
966
Number of states
50
*One state is missing for the trade dependence data.
All other statistics are from all 50 states.
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Table 2: Total State Expenditures in U.S. States, 1987-2006
VARIABLES
Liberalism
Trade Exposure

Per Capita Total State Expenditures
(1)
(2)
(3)
21.82***
(6.34)
-20.45*
(11.14)

17.41***
(6.39)

Trade Dependence

-48.73***
(13.04)
-174.72***
(29.21)

-7.73
(10.17)

Liberalism x Trade Exposure

8.71***
(1.54)

Year Fixed Effects
State Fixed Effects
Constant

(included)
(included)
559.17
(654.84)

18.48*
(10.92)
17.98
(29.11)
21.88
(14.63)
-0.06
(9.04)
-757.17*
(425.09)
5.36
(6.71)
-25.71*
(13.56)
532.50***
(185.70)
-10.63*
(9.36)
(included)
(included)
812.29
(623.39)

Observations
R-squared
Number of state
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

966
0.97
49

946
0.97
48

% Black
Real Per Capita GDP Growth
Real Per Capita Income
Dependency Ratio
Female Labor Force Partic. Rate
Partisan Control
Party Competition

-5.74
(8.91)

-98.28***
(37.25)

Liberalism x Trade Dependence
% Unemployment

(4)

26.67**
(11.05)
26.38
(30.03)
29.02**
(13.96)
1.11
(8.91)
-1,703.81***
(455.12)
12.85*
(7.02)
-22.84*
(13.60)
481.86***
(186.01)

% Manufacturing Output
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37.95***
(11.62)
32.37
(30.09)
30.62**
(13.83)
5.14
(8.91)
-2,231.48***
(446.80)
11.01
(7.04)
-13.43
(13.58)
329.60*
(188.42)

(included)
(included)
2,116.69***
(673.45)

4.04**
(1.59)
20.05*
(10.95)
6.55
(29.65)
21.63
(14.52)
0.53
(9.08)
-625.69
(420.60)
6.16
(6.59)
-16.98
(13.38)
466.25**
(182.85)
-11.46*
(8.92)
(included)
(included)
1,349.08**
(638.59)

966
0.97
49

946
0.97
48

Table 3: State Welfare Expenditures in U.S. States, 1987-2006
VARIABLES
Liberalism
Trade Exposure

State Welfare Spending (per capita)
(1)
(2)
(3)
7.67***
(2.54)
-9.50*
(4.86)

6.13**
(2.58)

Trade Dependence

-10.15**
(4.82)
-48.45***
(12.32)

10.33***
(3.20)

Liberalism x Trade Exposure

2.20***
(0.61)

Year Fixed Effects
State Fixed Effects
Constant

(included)
(included)
-133.12
(264.31)

11.68***
(4.35)
25.60**
(10.75)
-6.55
(4.36)
3.70
(2.50)
-337.30*
(174.28)
8.14***
(2.53)
-5.61
(5.13)
-51.70
(64.55)
-9.22***
(2.02)
(included)
(included)
-68.44
(261.28)

Observations
R-squared
Number of state
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

966
0.93
49

946
0.93
48

% Black
Real Per Capita GDP Growth
Real Per Capita Income
Dependency Ratio
Female Labor Force Partic. Rate
Partisan Control
Party Competition

2.41
(3.90)

-4.20
(13.94)

Liberalism x Trade Dependence
% Unemployment

(4)

18.49***
(4.32)
18.30*
(10.66)
-4.10
(4.28)
3.61
(2.48)
-539.07***
(181.55)
10.30***
(2.72)
-3.04
(5.08)
-99.75
(65.70)

% Manufacturing Output
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21.34***
(4.38)
19.81*
(10.57)
-3.69
(4.30)
4.63*
(2.52)
-672.32***
(182.64)
9.83***
(2.72)
-0.67
(5.13)
-138.19**
(64.70)

(included)
(included)
260.19
(275.34)

0.65
(0.59)
11.93***
(4.32)
23.76**
(10.83)
-6.59
(4.35)
3.79
(2.50)
-316.20*
(173.70)
8.27***
(2.53)
-4.20
(5.19)
-62.34
(65.59)
-9.35***
(2.03)
(included)
(included)
17.70
(271.75)

966
0.93
49

946
0.93
48

Figure 1: Predicted Total State Expenditures as Liberalism Varies
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Figure 2: Total State Expenditures, Liberalism, and Trade Exposure
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Figure 3: Total State Expenditures, Liberalism, and Trade Dependence
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Figure 4: State Welfare Expenditures, Liberalism, and Trade Exposure
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Figure 5: State Welfare Expenditures, Liberalism, and Trade Dependence
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Appendix 1: Construction of Trade Exposure Index
In this section we outline the construction of trade exposure, which differs from trade
dependence in that it is a measure of global market positioning rather than the relative size of a
state’s international trading economy. We consider two components for the measure: (1) a state’s
comparative advantage in the production of a particular good or service, and (2) where those
particular industries fall along the net export – net import spectrum for the U.S. as a whole. We
discuss each in turn.
Balassa (1965) laid the foundation for measuring revealed comparative advantage (RCA)
index. For country A and any good i, the standard Balassa RCA index is simply good i’s share of
total exports in country A relative to good i’s share of world exports. For example, if i exports
coming from country A were 30% of all of country A’s exports but i exports from the world
were only 15% of total world exports, then country A has an RCA index of 2 in the production of
good i. And because it is greater than one, country A is said to have a revealed comparative
advantage in good i. One limiting characteristic of the RCA index is that it is limited to a
particular good, service, or industry. To resolve this issue, we consider three industries (i.e.
services, agriculture, and manufacturing) instead of trade in a single industry. A second
constraint is that disaggregated U.S. state-level international export data by industries is limited,
especially in the years before 2000. Therefore we use employment in a given industry in lieu of
exports to compose an adjusted Balassa RCA index and use it as the first component of our index.
We construct the following adjusted RCA measure for each state s, at time t, and where US is the
aggregate United States data, and Emp is employment:

adj. RCA =
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The second component of our index is the nature of the industry or the goods and services
being traded. Our goal here is to identify how the goods and services that states export abroad
map onto the United State’s net export – net import continuum. Do states specialize in goods that
compete with foreign imports or do they specialize in industries that the US itself has a revealed
comparative advantage in? For this component we construct an adjusted Grubel-Lloyd (GL)
index of intra-industry trade as shown below (Grubel and Lloyd 1971; 1975). Different from the
original GL index that uses absolute value of net exports, we use the real value of net exports
since we are interested in mapping industries into the entire net export – net import spectrum.
Our adjusted GL index ranges from -1 to 1, with 1 meaning there are only exports and no
imports of industry i-related goods or services in the U.S., and -1 meaning there are only imports
and no exports of industry i-related goods in the U.S..
adj. GL =

By combining the two components, we create a measure of trade exposure, which is an
index of states’ comparative advantage in particular industries weighted by an industry’s position
on the U.S. net exports – net import spectrum. Multiplying the two components together allows
comparison across states and years.

Trade Exposureit

The first component in parenthesis is the adjusted RCA index and the second is the
adjusted GL index. We also take the negative so that higher levels of trade exposure imply that a
state has a comparative advantage in goods or services for which the U.S. does not have a
comparative advantage in. This implies that a state’s production takes place alongside U.S. net
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imports of similar goods or services. On the other end, lower levels of trade exposure suggest a
state has a comparative advantage in an industry in which the U.S. also has a comparative
advantage in as suggested by the U.S. being a net exporter of that industry’s goods or services.
The employment data for the American states come from the U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis’ Regional Economic Accounts, while the U.S. export data come from the World Trade
Organization’s Statistics Database. Industry-level data spans the SIC and NAICS era
classification systems. In order to make the two systems speak to each other, we converted the
SIC data to 2-digit NAICS when possible, and also used only finance, insurance, and real estate
as a proxy for services. In its raw form, trade exposure centers on zero. For our data, the mean is
-.08, the minimum is -.8, the maximum is .5, and has a standard deviation of .21. For more
intuitive presentation in the figures of the main text, we rescaled the measure to be from 0-13,
and with a mean of 7.5 and a standard deviation of 2.5.

35

Appendix 2: Robustness to Alternative Specification Using an Error Correction Model
Banerjee, Dolado, Galbraith and Hendry (1993) recommend the error correction model (ECM)
for non-stationary and co-integrated time series data. Following their advice, we conduct various
tests on stationarity and cointegration of our panel data. The panel unit root analyses of our
dependent variables show that our dependent variables (i.e., total spending and welfare spending)
are both non-stationary, and the Westerlund tests detect cointegration between the core
independent variables and both dependent variables (Dickey and Fuller 1979; Phillips and Perron
1988; Westerlund 2007; Persyn and Westerlund 2008). Thus, we deem the error correction
model as another possible appropriate modeling strategy for our CSTS data. In an ECM, the
first-difference of the dependent variable is estimated as an equation of the lagged dependent
variable, the first difference and the lagged independent variables, which we specify as:
∆𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝑎 + 𝛽1 𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 Δ𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑖𝑖

where Δ represents the annual change, Y is total state expenditures per capita or state welfare
expenditures per capita for state i in year t, X is a vector of independent variables, and e is the
error term. The results of our error correction models are presented in the table below, and we
also use Clarify coupled with Stata 12.0 to draw the following figures to graphically demonstrate
the interactive effects of globalization (i.e., trade exposure and trade dependence) and citizen
liberalism on spending (King, et al. 2000). While facing higher levels of economic globalization,
the association between liberalism and spending, as indicated by the slope of the predicted lines,
either stays the same or increases slightly. The bottom line is that even when we use a more
stringent modeling strategy, we still find that the congruence of opinion and policy does not
attenuate when states face a more globalized environment.
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Table A1: State Government Total and Welfare Spending in Error Correction Models
Total Spending
Dependent Variable t-1
Δ Liberalism
Liberalism t-1
Δ Trade Exposure
Trade Exposure t-1
Δ Liberalism × Δ Trade Exposure
Liberalism t-1× Trade Exposure t-1
Δ Trade Dependence
Trade Dependence t-1
Δ Liberalism × Δ Trade Dependence
Liberalism t-1× Trade Dependence t-1

Model (1)
Coeff.
.014
-2.23
10.26
2.22
11.75
-6.87
-.24

(SE)
(.03)
(6.17)
(8.48)
(17.38)
(19.33)
(5.14)
(1.00)

Model (2)
Coeff.
.017
-2.56
2.86

(SE)
(.02)
(6.57)
(4.43)

3.39
-19.93
-1.11
.97

(11.65)
(16.62)
(5.38)
(.71)

Δ % Unemployment
22.05
(16.06)
21.53
%Unemployment t-1
-18.17
(12.19)
-20.53
Δ % black
-.46
(68.55)
-6.29
% black t-1
.32
(1.14)
.78
Δ Real per capita income
-23.87
(92.61)
-19.12
Real per capita income t-1
.20
(3.25)
1.11
Δ Per capita growth
12.01
(28.92)
9.23
Per capita growth t-1
16.85
(31.98)
13.41
Δ Dependency Ratio
277.17
(869.66)
288.17
Dependency Ratio t-1
147.33
(150.67)
32.98
Δ Female labor force participation
-13.52+ (7.05)
-15.08*
Female labor force participation t-1
-1.90
(3.53)
-3.16
Δ State Government Partisan Control
-10.74
(13.90)
-11.39
State Government Partisan Control t-1
-8.42
(9.19)
-4.57
Δ Party Competition
136.01
(286.72)
179.33
Party Competition t-1
16.76
(67.52)
40.54
Δ % Manufacturing
2.11
%Manufacturing t-1
.36
Constant
-24.70
(364.06)
269.33
N
917
898
R-Square
.0698
.0647
Wald Chi-Square
62.35
55.48
Significance levels: + 0.10 level, * 0.05 level, ** 0.01 level, *** 0.001 level

(17.21)
(14.58)
(71.62)
(1.02)
(91.80)
(3.58)
(28.44)
(31.09)
(965.97)
(192.17)
(7.64)
(4.03)
(13.83)
(9.19)
(288.57)
(68.81)
(7.16)
(1.43)
(431.10)

Welfare Spending
Model (3)
Coeff.
-.00
-.24
.92
8.99+
-1.17
-2.21
.25

(SE)
(.02)
(2.39)
(3.42)
(5.29)
(8.08)
(2.36)
(.41)

13.78*
4.43
17.17
-.06
62.11*
-.85
-21.84*
-25.23*
-3.44
76.86
-4.46*
.52
-5.41
-4.67
46.99
19.66

(5.51)
(3.43)
(20.79)
(.30)
(31.08)
(1.32)
(10.03)
(10.68)
(280.31)
(54.88)
(2.15)
(.74)
(5.54)
(3.05)
(93.39)
(37.24)

-69.04
934
.1042
50.39

(117.30)

Model (4)
Coeff.
.013
.16
.03

(SE)
(.02)
(2.57)
(2.16)

2.76
-10.11+
.67
.42+

(3.39)
(5.93)
(1.70)
(.25)

13.92*
4.05
16.02
.15
47.83
-.08
-17.63+
-20.234+
-202.68
34.21
-5.37*
.33
-4.84
-2.95
50.73
22.53
.40
.11
1.74
898
.0973
44.01

(5.74)
(4.13)
(21.80)
(.30)
(32.18)
(1.50)
(10.29)
(10.95)
(329.39)
(62.39)
(2.24)
(.84)
(5.80)
(3.11)
(95.25)
(39.21)
(3.08)
(.47)
(91.79)

Figure A1: Predicted value of change in total spending as liberalism varies from minimum to maximum values
under high and low levels of trade exposure or trade dependence.
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Figure A2: Predicted value of change in welfare spending as liberalism varies from minimum to maximum
values under high and low levels of trade vulnerability or exposure.
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Endnotes
1

Author names are listed in alphabetical order.

2

Whereas early research using demographic proxies for opinion data found little connection between opinion and public
policy (e.g. Sharkansky and Hofferbert 1969), the vast majority of scholarship over the past few decades points to a robust
connection (Burstein, 2010; 2003). This linkage has been considered over both the long and short term, with Wright,
Erikson, and McIver’s (1985; 1987; 1993) path breaking work notably showing that the most liberal polities tend to have
the most liberal policies and with others (Stimson, MacKuen and Erikson 1995; Page & Shapiro 1983) showing that short
term opinion shifts precede congruent policy changes. Not only temporally robust, the opinion-policy linkage generally
holds across diverse measurement decisions, with indicators of specific and general political opinions and variously
conceived policy outcomes generally confirming the linkage (e.g. Brace, et al. 2002). Although this literature focuses on
the United States, and particularly the American states, recent scholarship employing cross-national data also supports the
view that voters’ political preferences tend to map with policy outcomes in developed democracies (Brooks and Manza
2006a; 2006b).

3

As importantly, states have a wide range of citizen ideologies and largely control the nature of state policy and public
spending (Garand, 1985; Berry, Ringquist, Fording, & Hanson, 1998; Kelly & Witko, 2012).

4

This can be seen as an extension of typical race-to-the-bottom theory of market preserving federalism that suggests that
many U.S. or foreign firms will move to the American states with the lowest wages, taxes, and regulations, thus
pressuring state spending downward through inter-state competition (Tiebout 1956; Weingast 1995; Volden 2002). Global
competition, compared to state-to-state competition, is special only as a matter of degree. But the difference in degree is
significant, as the variance between U.S. states’ environmental, tax, and wage conditions and developing countries’
conditions is dramatically wider than the variance between U.S states.
5

As Mosely plainly reviews this perspective, “[g]overnments must sell their policy not only to voters, but also to
international investors” (2000, 357).

6

Readers should consider the possibility that a null interaction term (public opinion * globalization) stems from poor
measurement rather than the mechanisms outlined in the RTM theory, given that noisy measures inflate standard errors
and often lead to null results.

7

As a robustness check, we use % overall state expenditure/gross state product and % state welfare expenditure/gross
state product and the logarithm of spending as alternative dependent variables. Additionally, we use the State and Local
Government Finance Report of the U.S. Census to combine state and local government total spending and state and local
welfare spending. The implications for the hypotheses are very similar to the results presented in this paper and support
the same key conclusions of no significant attenuation of the opinion-policy connection in highly globalized states.

8

For our general liberal opinion measure we largely follow Stimson, MacKuen, Erikson (1994). “These real preferences,
what we have called ‘policy mood,’ (Stimson 1991) are standing predispositions toward the role of government. Global
public opinion is at the highly generalized level at which we believe typical citizens – not C-SPAN junkies- approach
government.” (30)….”much of public opinion in American politics can be understood as generalized views toward
government itself.” (31). And as Manza and Cook point out, the focus on general policy mood avoids the low policy
information on the part of the public (2002: 637).

9

As a robustness check, we replace our dependency ratio with % older population (over 65 years old) and % young
population (under 18 years old), individually, and the models show very similar results.

10

We used the Clarify program in Stata 12.0 to graph all our figures (King, et al. 2000).

11

We also ran a series of models using TANF cash benefits for a family of three as the dependent variable. This variable
has two notable problems, however, which relegates its use to a robustness check rather than as a core part of the analysis.
Welfare generosity data are available for only about half the time series and this measure often does not vary much within
the same state for many years at a time. Nonetheless, across the models, in no case is the interaction term statistically
significant; again, the opinion liberalism – public policy linkage is not weaker in states with high levels of global trade.
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